THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST AND ALTERNATIVES TO WAR

On the War in Ukraine

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine turned a widespread social conflict and the armed conflict along the Russia/Ukraine border into a conventional war after the invasion in 2022, contravening the international right to national territorial sovereignty. Like all Western wars, this war has sparked new and old debates at various levels of society. Issues such as the best defence models, involvement in wars in other countries, the arms trade, the role of international bodies in global conflicts, and the shaping of global geopolitics once again dominated the news and our social discourse.

This report stands against this war, and against all wars. It draws on some of the most common social arguments, debates and narratives that spring up when a new war breaks out, to challenge the hegemonic militarist narrative by providing a few of the ethical and political reflections from political pacifism. We are aware that we will not be able to address all of them in a publication of this nature.

ON THE JUSTIFICATION OF WAR

■ Political pacifism highlights two essential ideas: first, that war is inherently unjust, and so debates over when it can be justified are irrelevant. And second the need for consistency coherence between means and ends. Justice cannot be achieved by methods that are not, likewise, just.

■ The United Nations' legal architecture concentrates decision-making power in the UN Security Council. Its permanent members have veto rights, meaning they can block resolutions that go against their interests. In this sense, the UN Security Council's five members are in a position of *de facto* impunity from the laws they themselves dictate. This position is akin to that of an absolutist monarch.

- A range of diverse military invasions did not meet a military response - they were answered with non-violent tactics. The most successful happened in the Ruhr region of Germany when France and Belgium invaded in 1923, and in Denmark and Norway when the Nazi's invaded in 1940, and in 1968 when Warsaw Pact and Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia.

- When the discourses argue that the West is defending liberal values and bringing democracy and freedom to countries such as Ukraine (or Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and so many others), it's a good idea to check those countries' indicators, which have not improved, in terms of: increasing women's freedom, greater equality, or greater security in terms of housing, food, health and education.

ON THE ALTERNATIVES TO WAR

- In 1991, in the face of the threat of an invading army, the three Baltic republics developed plans for unarmed civil resistance. The Government of Lithuania drew up a civil resistance plan based on non-cooperation and disobedience; Latvia created the Center on Nonviolent Resistance, which issued recommendations on what to do in the face of military aggression, and the Estonian government drafted a manual giving civilians specific instructions on how to resist an invasion.

- Various studies demonstrate that nonviolent action is more successful in achieving political objectives than armed violence. A total of 268 campaigns between 1950 and 2014 have been studied (153 violent, 115 involving civil resistance). Of these, 51% of the civil resistance campaigns were successful, whereas only 30% of the armed struggles achieved their goals. A well-organised civil society can pose a serious challenge and threat to power and the authorities.

- After a war, agreements or pacts impose one side's will over the others. But much better conflict solutions are reached through dialogue, because these are based on willingness to make concessions. Las-

ting solutions to conflicts are almost never based on defeating the other.

- Government responsibility by action or inaction must be examined in any conflict. If people like Hitler came to power, we need to look at the causes that made this possible, which include: the war reparations imposed on Germany after World War I; support for Nazism as a way of stopping Soviet and communism, and the support US magnates gave the Third Reich in order to obtain a share of the colonial resources previously controlled by the United Kingdom and France.

ON WHY AND HOW TO AVOID WAR

- The climate crisis is now at a point of no return. In this context, the military security model becomes instrumentally responsible for environmental disaster, because it secures and protects fossil fuels and predatory actors, maintaining the *statu quo*. Decarbonisation implies demilitarisation.

- The conscription of thousands of Russian and Ukrainian men is profoundly discriminatory. It defines all men as potential combatants, and those who want to help solve the conflict in other ways as traitors, not only to their country, but also to their gender and their gender obligations. This stigmatises and makes invisible any men who refuse to wage war, out of fear or conviction.

- In 2017, the United Nations adopted The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. None of the nuclear powers have ratified it. If we want to achieve peace in Europe after the war in Ukraine, a commitment to the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from European soil will be highly desirable.

- Physical damage is the most visible scourge of war, but conflict also has a brutal impact on mental health, on the destruction of culture and the tearing apart of the fabric of community, as shown by the indicators from various conflicts. War also reinforces patriarchal values and leads to values of affiliation being replaced by values of confrontation.

INTRODUCTION

The war in Ukraine has given birth to a reality we didn't want to witness. The culture of war, which accepts, justifies, and promotes the use of force as the best way to deal with conflicts, seems to have been irreversibly injected into governments of all colours and origins, with the consent and even praise of most people. Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy defended Ukraine's right to fight as passionately as the enthusiasm of those who follow the war's development on TV. Many journalists joined in, and after some initial hesitancy over the prevailing story, one sole, indivisible, hawkish account of the war in Ukraine achieved dominance.

As in many other wars, the initial emotional impact fades in time, and with it the media's ability to influence audiences; so divergences in the official discourse stating that war should be met with more war emerge, introduced by Russia, then echoed by Europe, the US and NATO. Initial doubts that were effectively addressed by an obedient political, economic and media system, which led us to believe there was no alternative to a military response in Ukraine, reappear when the prospects of an end to the fighting disappear over the horizon as the war progresses.

Once again, the military solution proves unable to provide a satisfactory solution, not only from a human perspective, as the tens of thousands of victims and millions of refugees show, but also from an economic perspective in both Ukraine and all the countries involved. In addition, the political impact of uncertainty, insecurity and the future remilitarisation of Europe and much of the world, will once again stymie policies of progress, equality and the fight against climate change. Inevitably, this report asks whether things could have been done differently, if war could have been avoided.

Pacifist organisations such as the Centre Delàs d'Estudis per la Pau opposed fuelling the war Putin sought, and have refused to promote,

foment, or cheer it on, out of conviction and out of realism. To paraphrase Vicent Martínez Guzmán, we know that pacifists are the only realists when it comes to avoiding war, because the only way to avoid war is to create the conditions for peace through shared diplomatic relations based on common security that enable peaceful coexistence, disarmament and the culture of peace: the antidote to hegemonic war.

The three sections of this report take a stand against war. The first questions the justification for war recited *ad nauseam* by jacks-of-all-trades colluding with the powers that be in media all over the world, and examines the theory of a just war, its legality, the legitimate right to self-defence, and the political justification of this war, in the light of some of its causes. The second section reveals possible alternatives to this and any war, emphasising nonviolent activism's effectiveness in the face of similar aggressions to those carried out by Putin's government in Ukraine. It provides diverse examples of peaceful, nonviolent resistance that took place during World War II, when not everything was about bombs and destruction, and the nonviolent actions of the civilian population were decisive in achieving the end of the conflict. The

third section develops four political arguments that, if given greater presence, could prevent more than one war, including the fact that war sucks resources away from our real priority: the future viability of life as we know it on planet earth in the face of climate change. It also examines the influence of patriarchy and competition on choosing the path to war versus the care, cooperation and construction of the conditions for peace that make war a more distant prospect. A reflection on the role of nuclear weapons, which are politically crucial in the war in Ukraine and could be used in any unwanted escalation of the conflict, is also provided. Finally, we focus on a crucial element that would prevent anyone in the position of taking the decision to go to war from making that choice: an honest evaluation of war's consequences, because if, instead of portraying war from the perspective of spectacular bombs, weapons and soldierly heroism, we talked about its damage and destructive consequences on all forms of life, based on the testimony of its victims, of the families who have lost their loved ones or who live with the insurmountable side-effects of armed violence, we wouldn't dare even suggest the possibility of dedicating a fraction of our time on waging it.

1. ON THE JUSTIFICATION OF WAR

1.1 IS UKRAINE A *JUST WAR*? IS THERE SUCH A THING AS A *JUST WAR*?
Tica Font

Throughout history, many philosophers have asked whether there is such a thing as a *Just War*. Plato (427 - 347 BC) criticised wars between Ancient Greek city states but was more understanding when it came to fighting the "Barbarians". Aristotle (384 - 322 BC) accepted wars against peoples born to be slaves who resisted subjugation. Cicero (106 - 43 BC) was the first to openly discuss the idea of justice in war, arguing that legitimate wars must be openly declared, be for a just cause and be conducted in a just manner.

In the Middle Ages, theologians such as Saint Augustine (354 – 430 AD) and Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274) wrote about the notion of a just war. Their thoughts include doctrinal discussions of the interpretations of Jesus' message, including his commandments to love your enemy, forgive those who trespass against you, his explicit condemnations of war and instructions to do good in order to defeat evil. In short, he tried to reconcile the teachings of Christ with the defence of the declining Roman Empire against invasions by other peoples. Saint Augustine justified war as a means to achieve peace.

Thomas Aquinas required three conditions to be met for a just war: first, princely authority, the prince was the only person able to call on the crowds to wage war. Second, the cause must be just, and third the aim of those fighting must be to either promote good or avoid evil.

Theologian Francisco de Vitoria (1483 - 1546) defended the legitimacy of defensive warfare in the context of the rights of the Spanish Crown in its conquest of America and of the rights of those already living on that continent. He deems it is legitimate to repel force with force, and considers offensive war lawful where those involved are claiming satisfaction for a prior injury, not only defending or claiming possessions. The Spanish theologian established received injury as the only just cause for war, and denied that religious controversies, territorial enlargement, princely glory or profit (which were the main reasons for waging war in his time,) were just causes. Vitoria is seen as the fa-

ther of the defence of natural law - his main contribution being that the war waged must be proportionate to the gravity of the crime.

Grotius (1583 - 1645) is famous for laying the foundations of international law. He secularised the notion of a just war, defining it as being undertaken to achieve or establish man's natural purpose: peace or a quiet social life. War is justified only if a country faces imminent danger, and the use of force is both necessary and proportionate to the threat. His main contribution is reflections on the dehumanisation of war. Grotius argues that war must respect the innocent and goes further by arguing that the destruction of neighbours' property, the death of hostages and the execution of prisoners of war is illegal.

The turn of the 20th century saw initiatives to establish rules concerning the limits of war: the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929 and 1941. The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions were held to discuss issues relating to maintaining world peace and settling international disputes. The current rules governing war are divided into two categories: the first covers the way in which hostilities are conducted, and govern the means and methods of warfare; the second covers the protection of civilians and soldiers outside the arena of combat (the wounded, sick and prisoners).

In the aftermath of World War I, 63 nations ratified the Kellogg–Briand Pact renouncing war, through which war was no longer a legitimate foreign policy instrument. However, this pact failed to prevent World War II. With the creation of the United Nations in 1945, war was once again deemed illegal, and only acceptable in the case of legitimate defence. The new international order, tending towards peace and collective security, established following World War II, was challenged by the breakdown of political cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union leading to the Cold War.

Contemporary armed conflicts continue to generate moral discussions over a state's right to attack another state, or to intervene in an internal conflict, or to defend itself from external military occupations. Public opinion has paid active attention to the behaviour of public and private armed forces, and the debate on the ethics and legitimacy of wars continues today.

The Vietnam War saw an increase in social condemnation of war as a political activity. Based on Gandhi's teachings, pacificists proposed exploring other techniques of non-violent resistance as a way to solve disputes, in the belief that war does not achieve the desired results. However, academic studies have continued to show that states act only in their own in-terests, and that their main objective is to achieve a greater share of power in the international order while containing that of their opponents.

In 1977, Walzer tried to include the medieval notion of just war in moral and political theory. His book on just and unjust wars revived academic interest in the debate on war's legitimacy and legality. From the earliest examples, all these studies accepted the inevitable nature of war, and even the necessity of war for a nation's survival. Now, some 1.500 years later, Christian theology's influence on the just war debate and this idea's continued existence is still visible and continues to adapt to the circumstances imposed by new wars.

Proponents of the just war theory could be said to defend the existence of just causes to legitimise armed actions. Realist currents interpret war as a necessary evil and do not subject the decision to declare war to moral requirements or ethical recommendations.

Pacifism was born with a strong spiritual component, from Eastern antiquity, through Jesus of Nazareth (the Sermon on the Mount), to Gandhi, Tolstoy, and Luther King, this spirituality has shaped the pacifist discourse, and conveyed the image of a god synonymous with love, truth and justice. In this way, peace is understood as a divine commandment humans cannot disobey, meaning that we must therefore reject the use of violence.

Political pacifism is based on and developed out of this spirituality. It articulates a political discourse and requires politics to be enacted from a logic of nonviolence. In short, pacifism has evolved out of spirituality to political action. Examples of this transformation include refusal to pay taxes (defended by Thoreau), civil disobedience as a method of nonviolent social struggle (Luther King) and political proposals in support of a more equitable and less unequal society (Chomsky).

Gandhi knew how to lead a new form of struggle, leaving the badly named "passive resistance" behind and turning civil resistance into an active mass struggle, he mobilised society to generate a kind of power that was not led only by political interests, but included spiritual and moral force. Studies of his ways of fighting, his ideas of conversion, and the humanisation of conflict or proportionality of means, expanded studies and interpretations of civil resistance as an instrument of social change.

Gene Sharp came to fame in the 1970s. He worked on the nature of power, methods of struggle and the dynamics generated by sustained protest campaigns. Sharp provided a scientific perspective on the phe-

nomenon and systemised the many leading and nodular actors of the nonviolent struggle. Sharp's functionalism and extreme pragmatism cooled Gandhi's spiritual and moral fervour, but provided a strategic approach. Sharp was aware of the existence of a vast history of civil resistance that had to be studied and classified as part of applied politics.

Sharp believed that the power of a ruler and the power of the people come from similar sources (authority, human resources, psychological and ideological factors, material resources, and penalty systems) although they are built and exercised in very diverse ways. Developing such sources allows those who are governed to obey, or to refuse to obey, because a series of factors contribute to such behaviour (habit, fear, moral obligation, self-interest, identification with the leader's politics, lack of self-confidence, indifference). Sharp's theory of power is as simple as it is direct, and was based on a voluntarist idea of consent using binomials such as obey/disobey and allow/oppose.

Political pacifism sees political proposals that defend peace as a priority, while denouncing violent responses. Pacifist thought starts from the injustice of war and does not consider scenarios in which war can be justified.

Political pacifism bases its theoretical discourse on two questions. First, the understanding of politics as a form of dialogue that avoids the friend/enemy binomial, and is the shared management of collective decisions in which dialogue must and does prevail over confrontation. This relates to the tradition established by authors who understand politics as building agreements to achieve a solution that avoids social conflict (such as Arendt and Habermas). Pacifism also asserts the need for coherence between means and ends. As Gandhi argued, justice cannot be achieved through unjust methods, so in political pacifism, the end does not justify the means.

The third element of political pacifism to highlight is the reinterpretation of one of the foundations of the logic of democratic liberalism: the relationship between lawfulness and legitimacy. In a liberal democratic system, the principle of legality provides legitimacy. Something just is defined as such because it has previously been deemed legal. Political pacifism reverses this relationship between law and justice, wherein justice must prevail over the law. In the words of Thoreau, "It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right."

Fourthly, we need to emphasise that political pacifism is firmly committed to the establishment of an international body that serves as an arbiter of state disputes, an idea related to Kant's message in "Perpetual Peace".

In the context of security and defence, political pacifism has espoused a range of options to replace military deterrence, which leads to an arms race. Political pacifism is committed to disarmament rather than deterrence. While arms are the basis of dissuasion, they also create the problem so it is better to eliminate weapons. Arguments in favour of disarmament are not only ethical or moral, they are also economic. The resources spent on arms can instead be used to improve people's lives. Political pacifism has articulated alternatives to militarism, such as civil defence.

It's worth adding reflections on the debates surrounding the war in Ukraine. Many have revolved around the legality of the Russian invasion and the Ukrainian government's legitimate right to respond, which leads to the need to give that government the weapons to counter the Russian attack and defend its sovereignty and territory. The standpoint of political pacifism focuses on other questions, such as "What did we do wrong in failing to avoid this war?" and "What can we do to stop it?" And in the debate over whether the war in Ukraine is just, we ask "Just for whom?"

The experience of other wars shows that many of the people on the losing side had to leave their homes, jobs and move to another country with nothing; those who stayed were subjected to silence, without being able to remember or talk to their neighbours about what happened, their bitterness or hatreds, the confiscation of their property, their inability to exercise certain professions, or the constant presence of police surveillance.

War is never just for those on the losing side.

People who supported the victors tend to have easier experiences after a war. The emerging regime provides moral compensation for their suffering, and they may receive social, professional or economic privileges.

All citizens suffer the consequences of war: impoverishment, the pain of lost family or friends, and tense relations between neighbours. But not everyone suffers equally.

It is possible to imagine such situations from the perspective of Ukrainians in areas where the fighting is taking place. Who will be on the winning side when the war ends… because it will end! Who will be the losers? Will there be "ethnic" cleansing? Will some have to abandon their lands and leave? This will not be a just war for many.

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1.2 IS THERE SUCH A THING AS A LEGAL OR AN ILLEGAL WAR?
José Luis Gordillo

The legality or illegality of a war (understood as commonly defined in peace research, i.e. as: any conflict involving one or more governments and the use of weapons, and that causes over one thousand deaths per year) is determined by the UN Charter, and by the limitations on the use of force established in what is known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL), in particular the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Protocols I and II.

The contents of these regulations are relatively easy to explain. In the words of the famous preamble to the UN Charter signed in San Francisco, the United Nations' primary aim is "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war [... and] to maintain international peace and security". As a result, article 2.4 of the Charter prohibits any member state from deploying "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any [other] state". The sole exception to this rule is set out in article 51. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United

Nations". But this exception does not authorise indefinite recourse to any kind of action. Such responses are only lawful "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Any other use of force is only legal if it involves *multilateral* deployment authorised by the UN Security Council, in accordance with the situations and requirements set out in Chapter VII. One such condition is that all military operations must be directed by a Military Committee reporting to the Security Council. This has never occurred because no government is willing to allow its army to take part in a war under the direct orders of someone else. Hence, when such action has been taken, it has been through a degraded legal practice in which the UN Security Council approves a resolution explicitly authorising the use of force by a collection of volunteer states led by their respective governments.

The legality of war also depends on the lawfulness of the actions taken during the fighting. You cannot do anything to any target. Clear limitations are in place and include bans on deliberately targeting non-combatants, the use of biological or chemical weapons, attacks on hospitals, hospital ships, religious or historically important buildings not used for military purposes, and on torture, deliberate starvation, and failing to provide medical care to prisoners of war. There are also less clear limitations, such as the ban on attacking civilian property, which is based on the flimsy distinction between civilian and military assets. Article 52 of the 1977 Protocols added to the 1949 Geneva Conventions states that "Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals." Civilian objects are defined as "all objects which are not military objectives", which Argentina's Leyes de Guerra [Laws on War] specify as meaning all those which "by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action or whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage." This allows a very wide range of things to be considered military targets, as modern societies contain very few civilian objects that may not also be used for military purposes under such a broad definition.

However, to gain a more lucid, more complete understanding of the problematic nature of the issue of the legality of war, we need to look at the institutional aspect of international law.

Like national laws, international law's effectiveness depends on both the legal documents and the power structures that interpret and apply them. As Max Weber rightly noted, law is a rule generally made effective (enforceable) by the likelihood of (physical or

psychological) coercion. He notes that "In the case of certain events occurring there is general agreement that certain organs of the community can be expected to go into official action, and the very expectation of such action is apt to induce conformity with the commands derived from the generally accepted interpretation of that legal norm." (cited from Economy and Society, University of California Press, p. 314 originally read in Spanish in *Economía y sociedad,* FCE, Mexico, 1944 p. 27).

As we have seen, the United Nations' legal architecture concentrates decision-making power on its Security Council. Most people are aware that this council is made up of both permanent and non-permanent members. And permanent members have a veto, meaning that they can block resolutions that go against their interests. This is why the system is ineffective when the five permanent members (China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) or their close allies (such as Israel) are guilty of violating international law. Wars initiated, promoted or supported by the US, Great Britain, France, Russia and China may be deemed illegal under the UN Charter, but there is no legally constituted power structure under that Charter that can coerce these countries. The system is absolutely powerless when the US or United Kingdom violate international law, as when they invaded Iraq twenty years ago, or when NATO attacked Yugoslavia in 1999, or when Russia violates international law, as in its recent invasion of Ukraine. In other words, these cases go *beyond legality and beyond the law.* In this sense, the UN Security Council's five members are in a position of *de facto* impunity from the laws they themselves dictate. This position is akin to that of an absolutist monarch.

When it comes to respecting the precepts of international humanitarian law, the situation is very similar. The legal mechanisms established to ensure compliance depend on either tribunals to which some of the great powers have not signed up to or recognised, for example China, Russia and the United States with regards to the International Criminal Court; or on the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction, which in theory means such cases can be heard by the courts in many countries, but in practice does not happen, as their governments subjugate observance of these legal precepts to political allegiances.

1.3 ON THE LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE
Pere Ortega

Analysts with an affinity for hegemonic groups in the global north have been adamant in affirming that the right to national security is related to military defence,

as the right to self-defence is a principle of natural law. This is also legitimised by the UN Charter. However, the relationship between security and defence can be counterproductive, as aggression does not need to be met with a violent, or even armed response. It's one thing to defend yourself against a violent attack, and another to assume that violence is the best response, as it may activate a spiral that leads to greater violence, such as war, from which it may be much harder to escape.

Aggression between people is not the same as aggression between states. In the first case, suffering is limited to a small group of people, while international aggression may lead to much greater violence: war. There is a consensus that war is the most perverse of all forms of violence, due to the enormous suffering it causes those involved. This is especially true when states have institutional mechanisms such as diplomatic, cultural and commercial relations capable of defusing disagreements and conflicts. These mechanisms can prevent troubles from leading to greater violence (such as war).

Yet, in some cases, all measures to prevent armed conflict may fail and a state may resort to military aggression. Faced by war, the injured government should ask itself whether an armed response is the best form of defence, when the resulting potential suffering may be much greater than the injury it aims to remedy. To answer this question, it needs to ask whether there are any less wilfully awful alternatives to war, especially after the 20th century's World War hecatombs have been deconstructed by modern thinkers. Mohandas Gandhi is one of the most important such figures, thanks to his ideas on conflict transformation through nonviolence. These ideas were subsequently taken up by multiple authors, notably Gene Sharp.

Based on the two foundational principles of nonviolence: disobedience and non-cooperation, Gandhi advised people to overturn those who violate their social or political human rights by using a combination of both methods. This principle can therefore be extended to those who use military force to seize a territory or nation. Gandhi's nonviolence is based on the conviction that power lies with the people, not the government, who always rule by delegation. He suggests that people can overturn human rights oppressors by using disobedience and non-cooperation in a nonviolent way.

Of all Gandhi's followers, Gene Sharp was best at developing his methods. He wrote several nonviolence manuals, which have been used as a guide in many insurrection movements. His methods are not

only designed for liberal democracies, they are in fact particularly aimed at dealing with authoritarian governments. They were developed to give citizens the opportunity to change the policies of governments that violate fundamental rights. These theories were systemised in manuals and books published in various languages by the *Albert Einstein Institution.* They have been used as a guide for many liberation movements and can be developed as a way to face a military invasion, and therefore avoid war. Gene Sharp had immense influence on political movements. His manuals and proposals were used to overthrow various regimes in the Stalinist bloc after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Serbia, and Ukraine. They also influenced the 2012 *Arab Spring* revolts in Tunisia and Egypt.

There are various experiences of military invasions that were not answered by a national military response, but by nonviolent means. The most successful happened in the Ruhr region of Germany when France and Belgium invaded in 1923; and in Denmark and Norway when the Nazi's invaded in 1940, and in 1968 when Warsaw Pact and USSR troops entered Czechoslovakia.

In all three cases, the governments renounced armed defence and called on their people to carry out a civil resistance campaign of non-cooperation against the occupiers.

In January 1923, France and Belgium invaded the Ruhr region of Germany following its failure to pay Versailles Treaty reparations for the damage it caused both countries during World War I. The Ruhr was rich in coal and iron mines and steel production, and Belgium and France aimed to seize the region in compensation for the Weimar Republic's failure to pay its colossal, unaffordable debt (226 billion papiermarks). The occupiers wanted to seize the coal and steel, so the German government responded with a civil resistance campaign involving nonviolent non-cooperation and disobedience of the occupiers' orders, accompanied by strikes and sabotage, which increased in line with the repression carried out (deportation, fines, imprisonment). The many forms of disobedience and such multiple resistance disoriented the occupying military forces to such an extent that in August 1925, they were obliged to withdraw (Boserup and Mack, 1985).

Following the Nazi invasion of Denmark in 1940, her government and royal family, hospitals, police, trades unions, professional colleges and media all organised a successful nonviolence campaign that either hid Danish Jews or helped them to escape. As a result, barely 5% of this segment of the Danish population were deported to concentration camps. A similar situation occurred in Norway, where repudiation of the German occupation took the form of helping Norwegian Jews to flee, with the support of the Lutheran church, the press, and especially teachers who rejected the German's attempts to use the education system to spread National Socialist ideology (Ortega and Pozo, 2005).

In 1968, the Warsaw Pact army invaded Czechoslovakia in response to her government's democratic reforms, which aimed to implement "socialism with freedoms". The refusal to respond to the invasion with military methods resulted in a large-scale civil resistance movement. This unleashed a major campaign of peaceful resistance and launched a powerful set of now textbook disobedience and non-collaboration commandments: "I don't know, I don't know them, I won't tell, I don't have, I don't know how to, I won't give, I can't, I won't go, I won't teach, and I won't do." No power can resist something undertaken on a massive scale. Clandestine radio became the resistance's main instrument. People took all kinds of actions: they painted over road signs so that tanks got lost; they ignored soldiers; they refused to feed the Soviets. All this created a united people and demoralised Soviet troops, leading to doubts, disobedience and desertions. The protest was eventually abandoned at the request of the Czechoslovak government, which was held captive in Moscow, and asked people to stop disobeying at the threat of severe repression (Ortega and Pozo, 2005).

These examples demonstrate that governments have other ways to resist foreign military invasion before they resort to war, which can cause much greater harm than the damage they are trying to avoid. This is not to imply that governments are renouncing their sovereignty by such actions - they are seeking other ways to connect with their people in order to resist an invasion using non-collaboration and disobedience, thus avoiding bloodier methods. The occupying force will respond with severe repression, which will also result in death and suffering, but this will certainly be much less than that incurred by war.

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1.4 IS WESTERN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN UKRAINE A WAR FOR DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM, OR DOES IT ANSWER OTHER GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS?

Pere Brunet, Tomàs Gisbert

Western discourse on the war in Ukraine talks about bringing democracy and freedom to a people threatened by an undemocratic state. But in reality the background is much more complex.

We live in a world of manipulated information. Social control systems impose increasingly government-controlled access to the internet. This is a state that protects itself against citizens (Levy, 2019). The "fake news" produced at massive scale by political parties and governments is the fundamental excuse these same players use to restrict fundamental rights. But when those who invest in creating disinformation claim to be the pillars of a supposed freedom of expression, they are undermining democracy (Levy, 2019).

We are seeing this in the context of the war in Ukraine, in which the information received by inhabitants of NATO member countries is ultimately one-sided and biased. It is therefore worth reflecting on the fact that, inter alia, this war has its roots in the policies followed after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The end of the Cold War allowed people to hope for a more just world that would end the threat of nuclear holocaust and an unbridled arms race. It opened the possibility of building international relations based on international law and collective security, with the creation of international bodies such as the International Criminal Court in 1998 and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in 1995 and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Enormous human gains from what was known as the "peace dividend" became visible. The end of the Cold War would allow vast resources that had been absorbed by militarism and the arms race to be used for peacebuilding and social improvement instead.

This was not the direction taken by the powers that won the Cold War. While the Warsaw Pact disintegrated, NATO's continuity was never questioned even though having lost its enemy, it had lost its raison d'être.

The reasons for this continuity do not lie in the quest for collective security, but in preventing the emergence of alternative powers that would question the political hegemony of the United States. The struggle for global hegemony has been one of the funda-

mental elements guiding the United States' foreign policy followed by both Democratic and Republican administrations after the Cold War. Project for the New American Century (PNAC), the think tank William Kristoll Robert Kagan founded in 1997, expressed this unabashed. It defended the need to ensure the United States' global supremacy and a unilateralist policy. When George W. Bush became President of the United States, people like Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, (all of whom were members of PNAC) reached senior White House positions and gained decisive influence on American politics.

The 2003 Iraq war was one of the results. Europe and Russia experienced less catastrophic consequences. Achieving US hegemony in Europe meant avoiding the emergence of potential alternative hegemonic powers. Which mean hindering Western Europe's rapprochement to Russia, to avoid the birth of a Eurasian centre that would overshadow US hegemony on the international stage. Even before the implosion of the Soviet Union, Russian elites aspired to Russia's inclusion in a Great Western power, as a way of facilitating mutually beneficial political dialogue and relations. But the West relegated Russia to Europe's margins (Richard, 2018). Even before Putin became president, this reinforced the idea that the United States was trying to prevent Russia's re-emergence as a global power (Lesvesque, 2013).

NATO has been the key element in this policy of Russian isolation. It allowed the United States to intervene decisively in the entire architecture of European transformation after the Cold War. First, by preventing the creation of an autonomous European defence force and consolidating the subordination of its European allies. Secondly, Europe's expansion to the East helped isolate Russia from its former Warsaw Pact allies and hamper its relations with Western Europe. (Gisbert, 2010).

Lea Ypi's studies and reflections are enlightening on the discourses arguing that the West is using wars to defend liberal values and bring democracy and freedom to countries such as Ukraine (and Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, etc, etc). She believes "liberal democracies" are neither liberal nor democratic, because the West isn't a free society for the disadvantaged. She demonstrates that to be liberal and democratic, you have to be critical of this Western reality.

Because liberal analysis of the political establishment is combined with economic liberalism, analysis and the focus on opportunity are filtered through the market. Do we have the right to export supposedly

democratic systems built on all kinds of violence?[1] If we look at events in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan, what percentage of the population has seen increased freedom? How many people have experienced democratic improvement? How many now have better personal security in terms of housing, food, health, and education? Where has violence been reduced? How many women now have greater freedom?

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1. Johan Galtung classifies violence into three categories: direct violence, which is the most visible and takes the shape of violent behaviour and acts; structural violence, which is the set of structures that deny needs and do not allow them to be met; and cultural violence, which takes the form of attitudes and creates a framework that legitimises violence.

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2. ON THE ALTERNATIVES TO WAR

2.1 WERE THERE ALTERNATIVES TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE?
Pere Ortega

Ukraine did not deploy any alternative to the traditional model of armed defence, even though such models exist, and some had been drafted for a potential Russian invasion.[2] The three Baltic republics did so, fearing such an invasion after their 1991 declaration of independence from the Soviet Union. Ukraine had two precedents of the government being overthrown by the people, using peaceful, nonviolent methods, which could have represented an alternative to war after Russia's invasion. It could even have saved Ukrainians from the greater evil of war, which according to UNHCR figures has created 8 million refugees, 5 million internally displaced people and 17.6 million people in need of humanitarian aid. Not to mention the enormous destruction of infrastructure, facilities, and the deaths kept quiet by both sides.

The question we should ask is this: could such tremendous suffering have been avoided? The Hippocratic principle applied in surgery recommends never intervening if the potential harm is greater than the damage the surgeon aims to remedy. There are examples of successful civil resistance in many conflicts[3] and military occupations (see Section 1.3)[4] in which unarmed civil resistance plans, such as those drafted in the three Baltic republics following their 1991 independence from the USSR, were deployed. At the time, none of the three republics had an army, and being small countries, they stood little chance of being able to stop a Russian invasion by military means. So, all three republics produced a range of materials to allow people to stand up to any Russian invasion. The Government of Lithuania drafted a civil resistance plan based on non-cooperation and disobedience. The Government of Latvia followed suit, establishing the Center on Nonviolent Resistance in 1991, in case its territory was invaded by a superior outside force that

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2. Gene Sharp's nonviolent civil resistance manuals are examined in further detail in Section 2 on the legitimate right to self-defence.

3. There are many examples of nonviolent civil resistance in ecosocial conflicts, especially in Latin America, where communities have resisted and confronted mining companies and governments who want to plunder and contaminate their lands. For example, Martín Beristany, C. and Pérez Bowie, J.A., *Historia de Andares* [Tales from my Travels], (2012), Madrid, La Catarata.

4. The occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, of Norway and Denmark in 1940, and of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

made military defence impossible. The Centre recommended non-cooperation with the occupying forces and authorities. Estonia produced a manual giving specific instructions to civilians on how to resist any eventual invasion. This manual deemed any order from sources other than the Estonian authorities to be unlawful and called on people to disobey and boycott the occupying forces by all means possible. These nonviolent civil defence plans were cancelled when the three Baltic republics joined NATO in 2005, as they believed this provided enough military defence capabilities to prevent a Russian invasion.

Nevertheless, in 2015, Lithuania decided that its army would have difficulty stopping a Russian invasion and used its 1991 plan as the basis of a new manual of nonviolent civil resistance based on non-cooperation and disobedience in the face of a Russian invasion. This manual was based on Gene Sharp's 198 Methods of Nonviolent Action (Sharp, n.d.).[5]

Could Ukraine have opted for civil resistance to the occupation using similar methods, and even have forced Russia to withdraw? Undoubtedly, yet it didn't. Even though the Ukrainian population twice used a peaceful uprising to overthrow two pro-Russian governments, successfully using nonviolent civil resistance tactics.

After gaining its independence in 1991, tensions in Ukraine emerged between those who wished to stay inside Russia's sphere of influence and those who wished to move closer to Western Europe. Ukraine was home to 8.33 million people of Russian origin, and 37.5 million who define themselves as Ukrainians, in addition to other minority groups. The Russian population was mostly located in the South, in Crimea (68%) and in the Eastern provinces of Luhansk (69%) and Donetsk (75%) on the Russian border.

From 1991, Ukraine's presidents (Kuchma, Yanukovych, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko) represented both tendencies - some of these leaders were pro-European and others pro-Russian. They were all oligarchs enriched by the plunder of national assets, allowing corruption to permeate Ukraine's entire political and economic structure, which created mass disaffection among her citizens.

In 2004, Ukrainian politics changed when pro-Russian Prime Minister Yanukovych faced pro-European opposition candidate Yushchenko. Yanukovych won the first round by a tiny margin (39.8% versus his rival's 39.3%). The opposition accused Yanukovych of large-scale vote faking and initiated peaceful protests and strikes that led to the nonviolent and peaceful "Orange Revolution", which brought down Yanukovych's government. The elections were repeated and opposition candidate Yushchenko became president.

Following the success of the peaceful revolution in 2004, the various subsequent elections showed that the country remained divided. In 2009 the pro-Russian Yanukovych won the elections, (which this time were monitored by international observers) again. His victory marked the start of a new period of tension, as the previous government had begun negotiating an association agreement with the European Union and NATO, which was rejected by newly elected President Yanukovych. His attitude again provoked huge public protests, leading to the 2014 Euromaidan revolution, which some people saw as a coup, brought down the Yanukovych government once again. Russia immediately responded by seizing Crimea, where its naval base provides access to the Mediterranean Sea, and by supporting an uprising in the two pro-Russian regions of Luhansk and Donetsk. The elections had given the majority to pro-Russian parties in these areas, and after the Euromaidan revolution, they chose to stay within Russia's sphere of influence.

All this does not justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which deserves unanimous condemnation as a military intervention that violates state sovereignty, which is a breach of international law. However, the salient point is that the political opposition twice used peaceful tactics to bring down a government and could have carried out a plan of civil resistance using disobedience and non-cooperation techniques to make Russia give up on its occupation, avoiding enormous suffering.

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5. Gene Sharp's nonviolent civil resistance manuals are discussed in more detail in Section 2 of this report on the right to legitimate self-defence.

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2.2 THE IMPACT OF NONVIOLENT ACTIVISM
Pere Brunet, Mario López

There are many forms and versions of nonviolent activism. Mario López' studies define methods of nonviolent action, passive resistance, civil disobedience, nonviolent resistance, nonviolent conflict, civil resistance campaigns, strategic nonviolence conflicts and other terms (López, 2016: 2). All these definitions share the fact that violence isn't used by one side (not that there is no violence).

Thanks to the Erica Chenoweth's statistical PhD research, we know that civil resistance campaigns were more successful than armed conflict in the 20th century (López, 2016: 11) and that it is therefore more likely to generate change.

Studies by Erica Chenoweth and María Stephan use data managed by The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project in its 2019 and subsequent versions. They use the data from the 2008 studies, which include aggregated data from 323 armed and nonviolent resistance campaigns (respectively 217, and 106) over the 1900-2006 period. Their conclusions show that nonviolent campaigns achieved a 53% success rate, versus a 26% success rate by armed campaigns. As they point out

> Our findings defy the conventional theory that armed resistance to conventionally superior adversaries is the most effective way for resistance groups to achieve their political objectives. We affirm that nonviolent resistance is a powerful alternative to political violence, and that it is capable of creating effective challenges for democratic and undemocratic opponents and can sometimes do so in a more effective way than violent resistance (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2008: 9).

Mario López (2015), studied a total of 268 campaigns over the 1950-2014 period. Of these, 153 were violent and 115 involved civil resistance. His findings are very similar: 51% of the civil resistance campaigns were successful, compared with 30% of the armed campaigns.

Both studies also provide very interesting data, which complements other research carried out on a lower number of campaigns (Schock, 2004; Nepstad, 2011).

The above studies reveal key trends: Schock believes that nonviolent activism achieves greater success when it increases the ability to resist repression, and when the activists demonstrate considerable tactical innovation abilities in their use of nonviolent methods. Nepstad concludes that greater success is achieved when a State loses its repressive capabilities, and if nonviolent resistance is closer to the armed force and police, or in other words if the ethical gap between repressors and repressed can be avoided. Mario López shows that civil resistance campaigns achieve 70% success when fighting dictatorships, for democracy, and against communist regimes, as in the fall of the Berlin Wall or the Arab Springs. The remaining 30% tend to end in failure when fighting for independence, against military occupation, against a colonial situation or in support of socio-environmental or cultural rights campaigns. It also notes that international political relations are decisive in determining the success of a civil resistance campaign. If the movement finds international support, it will succeed, but failure to achieve this position leads to high risks of failure. He points out that, in line with strategic factors, civil resistance campaigns tended to fail during the toughest periods of the Cold War, whereas success was achieved in periods of greater openness.

Finally, the Chenoweth and Stephan studies provide food for future research. For example, they note that government repression of a nonviolent movement is counterproductive, as it increases public support and solidarity up to six times more than in cases of government repression of violent resistance (the more violent the resistance the greater the legitimacy of a violent State response). They also state that repression produces greater numbers of defections and loyalty switches in the armed forces deployed to suppress a nonviolent movement, which increases the success of civil resistance by 46%. Time is another variable: the longer the civil campaign, the less likely it is to succeed. And the more people using nonviolent methods mobilised constantly and systematically, the higher the chances of success. If at least 3.5% of a national population are visible and carrying out transgressive acts in public spaces, a campaign's success is secured (Robson, 2019:1). Although this percentage of active participation seems small, it shows many more people agree tacitly with the cause. An organised and active civil society can be a serious challenge and threat to power and the authorities. By including some of the specific advantages of nonviolent campaigns, strategic historiography tends to believe that nonviolent campaigns provide widespread reliability and achieve support across numerous social sectors that did not initially share the resisters' agenda.

There are many other variables: external support for campaigns, international sanctions against the repressive regime, the use of new Information and Communication Technologies, the existence of independent media, the transfer of experience or knowledge of nonviolent political action techniques, and others, all help understand that any analysis must balance the numerous factors in play.

Why have civil resistance campaigns been more effective? An examination of large-scale strategic civil struggle should explain how this can be true, when most conventional literature and collective imaginaries believe otherwise. One of the virtues of social science is that it questions some of the dominant paradigms to answer new concerns. Despite the unquestionable empirical data in favour of civil resistance, contrary beliefs are deeply held cultural constructs that are difficult, but not impossible, to overcome.

There are some potential lessons here: you do not need to resort to violence to overthrow a powerful and repressive regime, however, the systematic use of nonviolent methods must be carried out so optimally that it generates areas of fatigue and exhaustion in its target oppressors. Campaigns must generate social power that society sees as an opportunity to improve justice and fairness, and that is not perceived as a threat to security and coexistence. If nonviolence is perceived as a way to extend democracy and committed, active participation in social improvement, very few sectors will refuse to facilitate this process, as it is a more reasonable and prudent method than a sudden change or rupture.

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2.3 ALTERNATIVES TO THE "MAKE WAR" DISCOURSE
Pere Brunet

The "Make War" discourse is intimately related to the desire to win and vanquish by force. But the notion of winning at all costs and the use of violent methods are both more than questionable.

Conflicts are inherent to the human condition. But their solution can be approached from the perspective of a battle that must be won or lost through dialogue. In war, which ends in peace agreements, the sides try to win positions before arriving at the negotiating table, because this will allow them to negotiate better from a position of strength. In this context, it is good to remember the subtle difference between the English term "*compromise*" and the Spanish term "pacto" (pact). The Real Academia Española (Spanish Royal Academy responsible for ensuring the stability of the Spanish language, which publishes a Spanish dictionary), defines "un pacto" as "acordar algo entre dos o más personas o entidades, obligándose mutuamente a su observancia" [to agree something between two or more people or entities, and mutually undertake to respect the agreement]. While the Oxford English Dictionary defines "*compromise*" as "To come to terms by mutual concession". Spanish lacks a term with the same meaning as "*compromise*", which is more subtle, broader and involves a generous and practical approach (Carlin, 2016). After a war, agreements or pacts impose the will of one side on the others. However, conflict resolution can be achieved much more successfully through solutions reached by dialogue, from a wish to understand the other party and through willingness to make concessions and to "*compromise*". Because durable solutions to conflicts almost never come from approaches based on defeating the Other.

War involves the use of violence. Violence dehumanises adversaries, radically ignores people's dignity and is also less effective than nonviolent methods, as Erica Chenoweth has shown and David Robson

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recalls (Robson, 2019).[6] War's violence is despicable,[7] selfish, ineffective[8] and the opposite of its official aims. Because peace is the opposite of violence, and because it's simply impossible to build real lasting peace using methods that are its antithesis. All these reasons lead us to believe that, unlike diplomacy, the "Make War" discourse is not realistic. However, the alternative of a peaceful solution achieved through dialogue and campaigns of nonviolent action is realistic. This has been demonstrated by the life of Mahatma Gandhi, the actions to overturn Apartheid in South Africa undertaken by Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, the campaigns led by Martin Luther King, and many others.

Feminism is another source of alternative discourse to the "Make War" cry. Virginia Woolf believed we should look for the causes of war in "virile qualities". In Three Guineas, she wrote: "another picture has imposed itself upon the foreground. It is the figure of a man; some say, others deny, that he is Man himself, the quintessence of virility, the perfect type of which all the others are imperfect adumbrations… His body, which is braced in an unnatural position, is tightly cased in a uniform. Upon the breast of that uniform are sewn several medals and other mystic symbols… And behind him lie ruined houses and dead bodies - men, women and children." (Woolf, 1938: 128-130), having stated earlier in the same publication that "without war there would be no outlet for the manly qualities which fighting develops - as fighting thus is a sex characteristic which she cannot share, the counterpart some claim of the maternal instinct which he cannot share…" Virginia Woolf explained that it is patriarchal values that generate the uncontrolled desire for power, the excess that affects the planet and future generations, violence and war. Because we find the blueprints of patriarchy hidden in the origin of the will to conquer and the global depredation of resources.

Patriarchal dominance, which intersects with the imposition of global economic and political structures through force and militarism, involves the use of force and violence to resolve political conflicts (Camps-Febrer, 2016: 12). Faced with the violent solutions that

emanate from the masculinities imposed by patriarchy in war and many other fields, feminism proposes commitment to the freedom to define and develop yourself, focusing on the fight against domination and exploitation through violence (Camps-Febrer, 2016: 22). And it suggests alternatives based on the awareness of your own vulnerability and the need for mutual care.

There is no feminism without antimilitarism (Camps-Febrer, 2016: 21). Which is why pacifism and feminisms are the realistic alternative to the "Make War" discourse.

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2.4 HOW TO REACT TO A NEW HITLER
Pere Ortega

Anyone who questions the validity of armies being the backbone of national security is often met with the question "How do we stop monstrous dictators like Hitler?" This is understandable, although the question is ill-intentioned, as it's always thrown at people arguing for alternative solutions to war. It is worth answering with another question: What did governments and political and economic powers do to allow such a sinister figure to govern Germany? This response can apply as much to Hitler as any other authoritarian dictator or government that started a war against another country.

Historiography broadly agrees that the causes that led to Hitler's rise stemmed from the unjust reparations and poor treatment given to Germany after it

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6. See the answer to the question "Can nonviolent activism be effective and generate change?"
7. Arundhati Roy: "Do we need weapons to fight wars? Or do we need wars to create markets for weapons?"
8. As recent wars (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, etc.) demonstrate, and as Henry Kissinger acknowledged in 2014: "Public discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation. But do we know where we are going? In my life, I have seen four wars begun with great enthusiasm and public support, all of which we did not know how to end and from three of which we withdrew unilaterally. The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins." Henry A. Kissinger (2014), The Washington Post, available: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html

lost World War I in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. These encouraged the birth of an aggressive nationalism that went against the countries that subjected Germany to excessive war reparations that prevented the country's social and economic recovery, which was personified in the birth of the ultranationalist, xenophobic Nazi Party and its sinister leader Adolf Hitler (Hobsbawm, 1995).

We must also ask ourselves what kind of Western democracy allowed Nazism to come to power. The answer is that if the political establishment that ruled Europe in those years had acted on the causes that brought Hitler to power, the abominable crimes committed, including the Second World War, could have been avoided.

Let's recap. Germany was controlled by her victors at the end of World War I. They required her to pay for the damage caused during the war. This debt's massive scale made repayment impossible. Then in 1923, when Germany didn't pay, France and Belgium decided to occupy the Ruhr, and seize the region's rich sources of coal and steel. In 1921, these conditions triggered hyperinflation: one dollar was equivalent to one million German papiermarks. It was impossible for the then Weimar Republic government to control such inflation. Western capitalism, particularly that of Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, was responsible. In 1929, the Wall Street Crash in New York generated a major economic crisis in all capitalist countries and had a serious impact on the German economy. This encouraged the German population to support Nazi Party nationalism that took an aggressive stance against the countries they believed had caused their hardship, and that Adolf Hitler's book: *Mein Kampf*, named as the causes of German suffering.

It is also important to note that the American, British, and French politicians saw Hitler's arrival as a good thing. He was a fierce anti-communist who could slow Russia's influence in Europe and would interrupt Soviet support of the communist parties active in their own countries. The United States also saw Hitler's Germany as a power capable of countering the British and French empires. From the moment Hitler came to power until the outbreak of World War II, the German dictator had the support of politicians and businessmen in the United States, Great Britain, France, and other countries, where he had many followers and where Nazi or fascist parties were created.

Following their World War I victory, the United Kingdom, France and the United States were allies. Great Britain was a particularly close US ally, but so was France. Both great colonial powers controlled much

of the world economy and world trade, to the detriment of American companies who were struggling to gain ascendance and access some of the resources extracted in their colonies and other parts of the world. The great US economic magnates saw an opportunity to rival the United Kingdom and France. So, when the then German head of state, Paul von Hindenburg, appointed Adolf Hitler as Reich Chancellor on 30 January 1933, he was applauded by many US businessmen, including influential figures like Henry Ford, Joseph Kennedy, the Rockefellers, etc. who gave Hitler's Third Reich financial support. They hoped he would counter British and French power and allow them to access the markets controlled by the European powers. For example, in 1938, influential US magazine *Time* named Adolf Hitler "Man of the Year" and put his picture on the cover.[9] Hitler also had many followers and admirers in England, France and other countries.

British and French "appeasement" policies, which aimed to cool Hitler's desire to expand into Central and Eastern Europe are another example of contemporary double standards. They decided not to sanction Germany and the Italian fascists for supporting the 1936 military uprising against the legitimate government of the Second Spanish Republic. Both Germany and Italy sent military aid and troops to fight alongside Franco and his insurgents during the civil war. They also failed to impose sanctions when Germany annexed Austria in March 1938. The decision to look the other way when Hitler's Germany seized territories, in breach of international law, was partly due to the fact that may British and French political leaders felt Soviet communism was more dangerous than German National Socialism, given Hitler's anti-communist stance.

If the liberal regimes in place after the First World War had taken preventive measures to avoid later conflicts, and not imposed damages and sanctions on Germany, they may have avoided the animosity of the German people. If the interests of unscrupulous capitalists had not seen Hitler as a leader who favoured their economic policies of expansion, if some political leaders had not given German National Socialism wings as a way of stopping Russian communism, and the expansion of Russian communism, then Hitler's rise to power could have been avoided, thus also avoiding World War II and all its atrocities. It is therefore necessary to insist that by acting on the causes that create conflicts, international politics can prevent war. Instead of seeking national advantages, we need to enforce the principles of international law to regulate the relationships between states. And when

9.   *Time*, volumen XXVII, January 1939

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a state commits crimes by ignoring them, the United Nations needs to provide the regulatory framework for international law. It must impose sanctions, and where necessary take action against states that breach international law.

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3. ON WHY AND HOW TO AVOID WAR

3.1 WHY IT'S BETTER FOR OUR OWN SECURITY TO REDIRECT MILITARY SPENDING TO INVESTMENTS THAT MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE

Pere Brunet

Security is a controversial concept. "Security" is understood as a tool used against visible crimes in public spaces and actions prohibited by the establishment, which means that the concept entails a process that establishes security based on social control (Miralles, 2023: 12). Whereas the concept of "human security" places people and their vital challenges (food, health, housing, work, education) at the heart of the issue. As opposed to violence-based solutions, feminist approaches to security speak of recognising our own vulnerability and the need to take care of ourselves.

But in this, our 21st century, the climate crisis is the greatest challenge for the survival of millions of people. Right now, earth seems to be heading towards reaching 1.5°C warming in combined surface air and

sea surface temperatures above pre-industrial levels by 2030 and a 2°C increase by 2050. Because of the cascading feedback loops involved, global warming could reach 4°C only 30-50 years later (Spratt, 2019). Johan Rockström, Director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, told the Guardian newspaper that if the world gets 4 degrees warmer "It's difficult to see how we could accommodate a billion people or even half of that... There will be a rich minority of people who survive with modern lifestyles, no doubt, but it will be a turbulent, conflict-ridden world." (Spratt, 2019).

We are starting down a path of no return. Increasing temperatures are changing climate patterns in profound and extreme ways, creating changes with direct repercussions on the habitability of some areas and on our ability to maintain dignified and sustainable living conditions for all people. Millions of people are already experiencing the disastrous consequences of global warming. We face a colossal challenge, an existential crisis of incredible proportions that society has still to accept, despite the warnings of the scientific community. The pandemic, drought and intense summer heat are just a glimpse of what our grandchildren, especially in the Global South, will suffer.

Humanity is in a radical dilemma. Very real current challenges are already destroying the Global South (climate crisis, pandemics, deforestation, floods, biodiversity loss and many more). We are on the verge of a catastrophic existential problem that may seriously affect the future of our species. These global problems require cross-border solutions coordinated at planetary level.

The carbonization of the atmosphere, global warming and the environmental crisis are out of control and will not ease soon. Numerous scientific voices tell us we need to achieve the green energy transition this decade, and that we must leave fossil fuels in the ground, by halting drilling, gas pipelines and so on. But governments are unable to take the necessary measures, which imply a drastic shift towards a new degrowth economy (Hickel, 2020). Power is no longer in the hands of governments, but in the vast network of interests and global power (including and connecting military and fossil fuel companies,) created in recent decades (Buxton, 2017). This network promotes war for the economic benefit of a few.

In this context, military security becomes instrumentally responsible for environmental disaster, because it secures and protects fossil fuels and predatory actors. The military network not only contributes significantly to environmental destruction (Parkinson, 2022), it also protects and maintains the *statu quo*. And in collusion with the fossil industry lobbies, it directly and indirectly prevents measures that could alleviate both the global environmental crisis and the suffering of millions of people. Yet even in our current, suffocating heatwave, we are increasing military spending and sending arms instead of coming together to put out the planetary fire, (GCOMS, 2023).

The security of our earth really needs a great, coordinated effort allowing all human beings to work together to combat the climate crisis. This requires a Copernican revolution allowing us to understand that this problem must be approached from a global awareness of the human species, using the tools of international cooperation and international democratic systems for planetary control and regulation. This can be achieved using new ecofeminist and post-violent approaches to security that are based on caring for people and the planet.

Our security must be built on the foundations of cooperation, not by oppression, depredation and military violence. And that kind of security needs the money dedicated to our current militarized "security" systems, which are not designed to solve our great challenge. It is therefore essential to reduce military spending to an absolute minimum. Instead of increasing it. As the International Peace Bureau's Global Day of Action on Military Spending (GDAMS) campaign demands every year (GCOMS, 2023). Let's work together and negotiate, instead of making war. We need to demilitarise, not arm. Decontaminate, not brutalise. Talk and listen, instead of trying to win by force. Because we now know that decarbonisation implies demilitarisation.

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3.2 DOES THE FACT THAT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ARE BASED ON PATRIARCHAL, COMPETITIVE POLITICS INSTEAD OF COOPERATION, MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW LEAD TO MORE WARS?
Blanca Camps-Febrer

This report understands patriarchy as the structure that, through many different mechanisms, organises our society into unequal power-based relationships defined by gender (Segato, 2019). Patriarchy not only consigns women to an "inferior" role to men, it also defines certain "masculine" values, behaviours and characteristics as superior to those it deems "feminine".

Physical strength, competition, exploitation, and dominance are valued, and these traits support a certain way of managing political, social or personal conflicts. It is important to take this last concept into account, to avoid simplistic and reductive approaches that simply consider whether men or women are included in a given context when assessing equality.

Thus, although armies increasingly include women, non-cisgender men, and people who do not follow heteronormativity, they are still patriarchal structures, which operate according to profoundly binary and masculinist values and processes.

There are three important elements to note:

1. Our current world is built mainly on structures of competition, exploitation and dominance. The world as we know it would not have been possible without the unpaid care and reproductive labour carried out by women, without the transoceanic slave trade, and without the domination and exploitation of natural resources. The political structures that emerge from this way of understanding the relationship of human beings with our world cannot change by the simple inclusion of people who were historically marginalised/exploited.

2. Patriarchy assigns different roles to men and women. These roles are consolidated by many socialisation and regulation mechanisms. It's not for nothing that one of the first measures taken by the Ukrainian government following Russia's invasion in February 2022, was to ban 16-60 year-old men from leaving the country to avoid conscription (Chevtayeva, 2022), and the conscription of thousands of Russians and Belarusians. These profoundly discriminatory measures define men as potential combatants, and those who want to help solve the conflict in other ways as traitors not only to their country, but also to their gender and their

gender obligations. This stigmatises and makes invisible any men who refuse to wage war, out of fear or conviction.

3. At the international level, patriarchy helps normalise support for militarism and the zero-sum narrative, in which the only solution to a political conflict is to eliminate the enemy.

Thomas Hobbes is one of the most frequently cited philosophers in the study of Western international relations. Briefly, Hobbes imagined a world without higher authority as a chaotic and violent place. "Man is wolf to man" is one of his most famous quotes. Hobbes imagined life as a savage state of "continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." (Leviathan, i. xiii. 9). If Hobbes had thought about women for a second, he might have identified many other social relationships indispensable for life, including in the wild state, from care to cooperation, symbiosis, and solidarity between humans and with other species.[10]

Although 372 years have passed since Hobbes wrote The Leviathan, his philosophy lives on as the foundation for many of our current institutions, and the way in which many people understand the world. War is its ultimate expression, and in turn "the ultimate tool for the reproduction of gender inequalities and hierarchies, where all genders are subject to different forms of discrimination." (Arimatsu & Chinkin, 2022).

But apparently contrary positions such as liberalism and the "international institutional order" that emerged in its current form after World War II are based on multilateralism and the idea that cooperation and international interdependence increases the costs of war and therefore reduces the chances of it happening. However, the system is based on underlying elements of dominance, enrichment and evident hierarchy, as well as cooperation-competition and on some states' military and nuclear superiority over others.

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10. Ann J. Tickner examines this gender bias, including gender blindness, in early international relations theorists, such as Hans Morgenthau, who based his political ideas on Hobbesian philosophy.

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3.3 THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIS WAR
Teresa de Fortuny, Xavier Bohigas

President Putin's declarations[11] have placed nuclear weapons in the media spotlight. Such intimidating statements are common in times of war. Hopefully they will remain confined to the war of words.

However, aside from their media visibility, nuclear weapons have played (and play) a primordial role in this war's origins and underlying causes. For many years, the West (particularly NATO and the US) have acted provocatively and irresponsibly by ignoring Russia's legitimate complaints about the position of US nuclear weapons and the US missile shield surrounding Russian territory. The US began deploying its nuclear weapons in Europe in 1954. They have kept them in place for almost 70 years, and are about to replace the hundred or so current weapons with new, improved, versions (Fortuny and Bohigas, 2023).

In December 2021, before Russia invaded Ukraine, she presented the US with a draft treaty to solve this latent conflict (Russian Federation, 2021). Its articles included the following: both sides would commit to not deploy short and medium-range missiles outside their national territories; both sides would commit to not deploy nuclear weapons (and their necessary infrastructure) outside their national territories and to withdraw those already deployed; the US would commit to prevent NATO from expanding into former USSR countries and would not establish military bases in these countries.

The treaty would have ensured the elimination of US nuclear weapons from Europe, ensured short and medium-range missiles would not be installed outside the US, and would have prevented countries such as Ukraine and Georgia from joining NATO. Remember that in 2019, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which specifically prohibited the deployment of such missiles. The USSR and the US signed the INF Treaty in 1987 and removed both sides' short and medium-range missiles from Europe. The signature of the INF dispelled the possibility of nuclear war in Europe. Since 2019 Europe is once again exposed to this threat.

If NATO and the US had accepted the Russian proposal, the war in Ukraine may have been avoided. But they refused.

The US missile defence shield in Europe is one more in a line of many Russian grievances relating to US foreign policy. The USSR and the US had also signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), which limited the number of ballistic missile defence systems in 1972. These systems are designed to intercept nuclear missile attacks. In 2002, the George W. Bush administration withdrew unilaterally from the ABM, in preparation for the installation of a missile defence shield in Europe. In 2009, the Obama administration approved installing the shield in Romania, Poland, Spain and Turkey. Russia protested. It saw the move as weakening its offensive capacity, and thus breaking the nuclear power balance between the two world powers.

European leaders make the grave mistake of identifying European interests with American interests. US foreign and nuclear policies are conditioned by US interests, which do not coincide with European interests. The EU's alignment of its position with the US (in the field of US-Russia antagonism) is bad for the old continent. Europe's geographical proximity with Russia calls for good neighbourly relations. If the war in Ukraine were to lead to a nuclear conflict, Europe would be its stage and Europeans would be the losers. Americans would look on from a distance.

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11. "Putin announces 'partial mobilization' of Russians for the war in Ukraine and launches nuclear threat" available in Spanish at https://www.eldiario.es/internacional/putin-anuncia-movilizacion-parcial-rusos-guerra-ucrania_1_9555071.html

Europe should recover an initiative such as the Charter of Paris (CSCE, 1990), which was unfortunately never consolidated. Before the USSR broke apart, Gorbachev proposed ending the Cold War by creating an integrated European security architecture. His proposal met with approval, becoming the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which was signed in November 1990. In 1993, Yeltsin dissolved the USSR with Western approval (the US believed the Charter of Paris went against its interests). Russian leaders privatised national assets and weakened their country (Poch, 2022). The Charter of Paris became nothing more than a scrap of paper.

Sooner or later, peace negotiations regarding the conflict in Ukraine will have to begin. It would be very useful if the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe were included, in order to achieve their withdrawal. A context such as the war in Ukraine could favour the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers refuse to dispose of their stocks, because they view them as a basic pillar of their defence policies. However, they must come to understand that the risks are too great. In 2017, the United Nations adopted The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. None of the nuclear powers have ratified it. It's about time that they do.

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3.4 THE IMPACT OF WAR AND THE WORLD

IT LEAVES BEHIND
Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto

All wars have similar impacts, albeit with differing degrees of severity. Such differences depend on the length of the conflict, its complexity, the types of weapons and the number of warring factions. Of course, the impact of any research will always depend on the direction of focus, the actors studied and the methodology used. Nevertheless, it is worth briefly recapitulating the general impacts of war. In this case, we will look at them from a peacebuilding perspective, and at models based on human security.

Physical damage is one of the most obvious consequences of war. However, its erosion of our mental health, and destruction of the fabric of community, both of which are essential to life, are increasingly acknowledged. As Murthy and Lakshminarayana point out, "Death as a result of wars is simply the 'tip of the iceberg'." (2006: 25). It is estimated that 10% of those who live through an armed conflict will develop severe mental health problems, and another 10% will develop behaviours that prevent them from leading their lives in a normal way. For example, the same study notes that after 20 years of conflict in Afghanistan, 67.7% of respondents had symptoms of depression, 72.2% suffered from anxiety and 42% suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), with the worst levels of post-war mental health found in women and the disabled.

Research organisation *Cost of War* has estimated other relevant data regarding the impact of the war in Afghanistan (to continue looking at the same example), this time in the period ranging from 2001-2021. They note that food insecurity was at 62% before the war, and 92% afterwards, and that the number of children aged under 5 years old with malnutrition was 9% in 2001, and 50% in 2021. They also estimate that poverty increased by 17% over those 20 years of fighting, and women's rights remained as restrictive in 2021 as they were in 2001 (Cost of War, 2023).

War creates profound social changes, not only as the result of the massive loss of life, but also due to enforced restructuring after the conflict. For example, years of conflict in Cambodia have led to changes, or even the destruction of existing social networks. Somalia has seen increased drug use by former combatants, and the near total paralysis of national health services stemming from the conflict (Murthy and Lakshminarayana, 2006: 26). War also has a lasting impact on those who find themselves having to leave to survive. Ugandans who have been in exile for 5-15 years have increased levels of alcohol consumption and suicide rates.

The physical and mental impacts on war survivors are part of a series of consequences that relate to armed conflict's ability to reorder and restructure societies, the world and our narrative and cultural imagination. It is interesting to look at gender in this sense, as the impact of war has been studied from two interesting perspectives.

War redefines women's roles, and therefore gender roles in general (Modell and Haggerty, 1991: 211), although this is usually temporary, and depends on women's prior living conditions. But what is more important and interesting, and should therefore be taken note of, is that war reinforces and produces a pre-eminence of patriarchal values, such as the use of force. "Times of war provide justification for 'strong-man' leadership." (Eisler, 2021: 277). Her observation isn't far from the reality of Zelensky and Putin, and the consequent threat of the loss of values of affiliation to values of confrontation.

Some studies show that when women's rights and emancipation are in decline or threatened, periods of war and repression are around the corner and vice-versa (Eisler, 2021: 267-277). These values are already translating into the staggering increase in global military spending to $2.24 trillion. This is an indication of increased global tension, as was military spending and the arms race during the Cold War. Wars and military spending are usually accompanied by their main social justification: fear.

As Bude points out, "fear leads to the tyranny of the majority" (Bude, 2017: 17). Fear of others distances us and erodes values of affiliation. This leads to a society in which bonds cause fear, which distances us from others, and ultimately leads to hatred.

All wars generate and reinforce fear of the other, as they require a narrative strong enough to justify the enormous damage caused. Increasing the perception of fear, benefits the military-industrial and security complex, which aims to provide security with weapons and technology, but brings us closer to societies of control and monitoring, as we surrender our freedom for security. Which, as Bude points out, leads us to the rule of tyranny.

The next step is to build hatred. As Tamayo (2020: 183) affirms, we need to argue against hate, which is an attitude that belongs to societies that are losing their values of cooperation and affiliation, values which recede in the polarised contexts of war, where fear can easily take control of the narrative.

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CONCLUSIONS

The war in Ukraine is not a Just war, because there are not morally just wars. The hegemonic realism of the powers has used wars to justify the violence involved in achieving their political goals, which include peace as the end product of war. Pacifism is the truly realistic option, as it proposes achieving peace without violence, which is the only way to build conditions for peace that do not give rise to new causes of future violence. Perspective is key to determining the just nature of a war. The winning side will see war as just, necessary, and legitimate, and will leave this view in writing in their dominant narrative, while the losing side will perceive it as unjust. In all cases, the victims' pain, which is the pain of those who have suffered human and material losses, will not allow them to accept that the war was just.

Just as the legitimacy of a war answers political interests, so does its legality. While the international structures of peace and security created after World War II, whose greatest exponent is the United Nations, aim to avoid war, its internal power structures determine the legality of war based on the balances of power and the will of great powers with veto rights. The Geneva Conventions do not prohibit, but regulate war, making the damage incurred politically acceptable. Nevertheless, despite international humanitarian law, civilians are and always will be those who suffer most. This situation is protected by international legislation that subjugates the legitimacy of wars to political power and is incapable of protecting the civilian population in situations of armed conflict.

In the war in Ukraine, as in many other wars, the path of legitimacy has been pursued through the 'right to legitimate defence', which is included in international peace regulations and central to the UN Charter. The development of the legitimate right to self-defence tends to overlook other ways of defending yourself, without needing to resort to war. Gandhi's principles of nonviolence and Sharp's nonviolent strategies have been used on countless occasions in major political conflicts, avoiding or preventing military responses to security challenges, political transformations and even to military aggression. Citizens' non-violent responses to the Nazi invasion, Soviet expansion or during the Arab Springs show that governments and societies have the tools to resist military invasion before resorting to war and causing worse damage than that which they aim to avoid.

The war in Ukraine has ultimately tried to find justification as a war in the name of freedom and democracy. It is inevitable that the different sides of an armed conflict will develop a political narrative that supports their decision to resort to war in order to achieve their territorial, economic or other objectives. But political accounts of war are not objective, they answer the needs of those who undertook them to find legitimisation. Democracy and freedom are perhaps the predominant narrative of the war in Ukraine and most contemporary armed conflicts. However, when we scratch the surface of the stories told by both sides, we find reasons or causes related to political, economic or social issues, and the desire for power on all sides. One of the main reasons for Western involvement in the war in Ukraine seems to be NATO's quest to political and economically weaken Russa. Otherwise, how do you explain the lack of US and her allies' military intervention in the many other armed conflicts around the world.

There are alternatives to the use of armed violence in political conflicts, in other words, alternatives to war do exist, and this is or was also true in Ukraine. Nonviolent civilian responses to major political challenges in Ukraine over the last decades prove this is true: they achieved changes in government through peaceful revolts. Nonviolent activism in all its forms is an option that has not only borne recent fruit in Ukraine, but all over the world. Studies prove that nonviolent campaigns are twice as successful as armed struggle. Chenoweth and Stephan, Schock, Npestad and López have studied hundreds of conflicts, showing that violence is not necessary to overthrow a repressive regime, and that the best way of doing so is to adopt democratic values. This relates to our proposal to do away with the discourses of victor and vanquished and replace them with those of agreements based on compromise to achieve lasting solutions. The use of violence, or war, prevents future peace commitments because the damage inflicted is insurmountable. Alternative discourses to war largely emerge from feminisms. Patriarchal dominance implies the use of violence to achieve political objectives: states using military structures. Feminism, as opposed to patriarchy, and pacifism, as opposed to violence, are the realistic alternative to warmongering discourse. It is worth remembering that the alternative to war against an authoritarian, dictatorial and undemocratic political figure, such as Vladimir Putin, is also responsibility by governments that supported, complicitly accepted, or simply allowed to evolve into confrontational positions, by their own actions or omissions, promoting scenarios in which choosing war becomes more plausible.

In conclusion, it is both possible and desirable to avoid war. By dedicating our efforts as a society, led by governments, to avoiding war, by not preparing and planning military defence, we will allow ourselves to focus on answering important priorities, such as the fight against climate change, which is an issue of planetary (not merely national) importance.

A realistic but critical and constructive reading of the situation is fundamental to improving international relations and avoiding war. Doing so allows us to see that conflicts between states or other powerful groups are resolved using a patriarchal, competitive logic, which contributes to the normalisation of militarism and war as the only solution to political conflicts. The current liberal alternative based on multilateralism and cooperation between states is a first step towards peaceful conflict resolution, but it is not enough, as it does not address the underlying structures and other elements of dominance in the international system that need to be determinedly addressed if we want to eliminate war, not only in the international treaties, but also in political practice. Nuclear weapons may be one of the elements that, if not eliminated, influence global political decision-making processes and armed conflicts in particular, as in the war in Ukraine. This is due to both their power as a deterrent, due to the risk of a nuclear disaster resulting from military escalation that can lead any leader to carry out a nuclear threat. As this is a global threat, we are all jointly responsible for it, which makes failing to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) extremely reckless from the perspective of global political security.

If a sincere, honest, democratic analysis of the human, social, economic, political, cultural, environmental and obviously security impact of war were made before launching into a conflict to which nobody can predict an end; if we emphasised avoiding the damage war causes, avoiding human pain and suffering, avoiding the destruction of infrastructure and ecosystems; then the decision to start a war would seem so impossible that any other option will always be better. Military intervention and war do not create a better world, although the victors always rewrite history to make us believe that the violence and inevitable crimes committed in the war that brought them to power, were heroic acts worthy of praise.

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